The phenomena of Islamic radicalism all over the world is directly linked to the Islamic madrassahs (religious seminaries) that are generously funded by the Gulf’s petro-dollars. These madrassahs attract children from the most impoverished backgrounds in the Third World Islamic countries, because they offer the kind of incentives and facilities which even the government-funded public schools cannot provide: such as, free boarding and lodging, no tuition fee at all and free of cost books and stationery; some generously funded madrassahs even pay monthly stipends to their students.
Apart from madrassahs, another factor that promotes the Wahhabi-Salafi ideology in the Islamic World is the ritual of Hajj and Umrah. Every year, millions of Muslim men and women travel from all over the Islamic world to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.
When they return home to their native countries, after spending a month or two in Saudi Arabia, along with clean hearts and souls, they also bring along the tales of Saudi hospitality and their supposedly “true” and “authentic” version of Islam, which some Muslims, especially the backward rural and tribal folks, find attractive and worth-emulating.
Yet another factor which contributes to the rise of Wahhabi-Salafi ideology throughout the Islamic world is the immigrants’ factor. Millions of Muslim men, women and families from all over the Third World Islamic countries live and work in the energy-rich Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait and Oman. Some of them permanently reside there but mostly they work on temporary work permits.
Just like the pilgrims, when the immigrants return home to their native villages and towns, they also bring along the tales of Saudi hospitality and their version of supposedly “authentic Islam.” Spending time in the Gulf Arab States entitles one to pass authoritative judgments on religious matters, and having a cursory understanding of Arabic, the language of Quran, makes one equivalent of a Qazi (a learned jurist) among the illiterate rural folks; and such charlatans simply reproduce the customs and traditions of the Arabs as the authentic version of Islam to their backward, rural communities.
The Shi’a Muslims have their Imams and Marjahs (religious authorities), but it is generally assumed about Sunni Islam that it discourages the authority of clergy. In this sense, Sunni Islam is closer to Protestantism, at least theoretically, because it prefers an individual and personalized interpretation of scriptures and religion. Although this perception might be true for the educated Sunni Muslims, but on the popular level of the masses of the Third World Islamic countries, the House of Saud plays the same role in the Sunni Islam that the Pope plays in Catholicism.
By virtue of their physical possession of the holy places of Islam – Mecca and Medina – the Saudi kings are the ex officio caliphs of Islam. The title of the Saudi king: “Khadim-ul-Haramain-al-Shareefain” (the Servant of the House of God) makes him the vice-regent of God on earth; and the title of the caliph of Islam is not limited to a single nation state, the Saudi king wields enormous influence throughout the commonwealth of Islam: that is, “the Muslim Ummah.”
Thus, when we hear slogans like “no democracy, just Islam” on the streets of the Third World Islamic countries, one wonders that what kind of a simpleton would forgo one’s right to choose their government through a democratic and electoral process?
This confusion about democracy is partly due to the fact that the masses often conflate democracy with liberalism without realizing that democracy is only a political process for choosing one’s representatives through an electoral process, while liberalism is a cultural mindset which may or may not be suitable for the backward Third World societies depending on their existing level of cultural advancement.
One feels dumbfounded, however, when even supposedly “educated” Muslims argue that democracy is somehow un-Islamic and that an ideal Islamic system of governance is caliphate. Such an ideal caliphate could be some Umayyad or Abbasid model that they conjure up in their minds, but in practice, the only beneficiaries of such a reactionary approach are the illegitimate tyrants of the Arab World who claim to be the caliphs of Islam, albeit indirectly and in a nuanced manner: that is, the Servants of the House of God and the Keepers of the Holy places of Islam.
Regardless, it is generally assumed that political Islam is the precursor of Islamic extremism and terrorism, however, there are two distinct and separate types of political Islam: the despotic political Islam of the Gulf variety and the democratic political Islam of the Turkish and the Muslim Brotherhood variety.
The latter Islamist organization never had a chance to rule over Egypt, except for a brief year-long stint; therefore, it would be unwise to draw any conclusions from such a brief period of time in history. The Turkish variety of political Islam, the oft-quoted “Turkish Model” however, is worth emulating all over the Islamic world.
I do understand that political Islam in all its forms and manifestations is an anathema to liberal sensibilities, but it is the ground reality of the Islamic world. The liberal dictatorships, no matter how benevolent, had never worked in the past, and they will meet the same fate in the future.
The mainspring of Islamic radicalism and militancy isn’t the moderate and democratic political Islam, because why would people turn to violence when they can exercise their right to choose their rulers? The mainspring of Islamic militancy is the despotic and militant political Islam of the Gulf variety.
The illegitimate, and hence insecure, tyrants adopt different strategies to maintain and prolong their hold on power. They readily adopt the pragmatic advice of Machiavelli to his patrons: “Invent enemies and then slay them in order to control your subjects.”
The virulently anti-Shi’a rhetoric of the Gulf-based Wahhabi-Salafi preachers, who are on the payroll of the Gulf’s petro-monarchies, is a cunning divide-and-rule strategy on the lines of Machiavelli’s advice. The illegitimate autocrats of the Gulf States cannot construct a positive narrative that can recount their own achievements, that’s why they espouse a negative narrative in order to vilify their political adversaries for regional dominance in the Middle East.
The Sunni-Shi’a conflict is essentially a political conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran which is presented to the lay Muslims in the veneer of religiosity. Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism is a threat to the Western countries but the Islamic countries are encountering a much bigger threat of sectarian conflict.
For centuries, the Sunni and Shi’a Muslims have coexisted in relative peace throughout the Islamic World, but now certain shady forces are deliberately stoking the fire of inter-sectarian strife to distract attention away from the home front: that is, the popular movements for democracy and enfranchisement in the Arab World.
Notwithstanding, Islam is regarded as the fastest growing religion of the 20th and 21st centuries. There are two factors that are primarily responsible for this atavistic phenomena of Islamic resurgence: first, unlike Christianity, which is more idealistic, Islam is a practical religion, it does not demands from its followers to give up worldly pleasures but only aims to regulate them; and second, Islam as a religion and political ideology has the world’s richest financiers.
After the 1973 collective Arab oil embargo against the West in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war, the price of oil quadrupled; and the contribution of the Gulf’s petro-sheikhs towards “the spiritual well-being” of Muslims all over the world magnified proportionally. This is the reason why we are witnessing an exponential growth of Islamic charities and madrassas all over the world and especially in the Islamic World.
Finally, it’s a misconception that the Arab sheikhs of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and some emirates of UAE generally sponsor the Wahhabi-Salafi sect of Islam, because the difference between numerous sects of Sunni Islam is more nominal than substantive. Islamic charities and madrassas belonging to all the Sunni denominations get generous funding from the Gulf Arab states as well as private donors.
About the author:
Nauman Sadiq is an Islamabad-based attorney, columnist and geopolitical analyst focused on the politics of Af-Pak and Middle East regions, neocolonialism and petroimperialism.
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