Even with violence ebbing across Syria as order is restored, Kofi Annan is still attempting to peddle a "peace deal" between the Syrian government and militants - demanding Syrian troops be withdrawn from cities just recaptured from terrorist forces. And as Annan seeks a reprieve for remaining militant forces, the West is meeting in neighboring Turkey, devising a method to rearm and redeploy them in order to reignite and perpetuate the bloodshed they claim they are trying to prevent.
More specifically, BBC reports in their article titled, "Syria crisis debated at Istanbul talks," that ways are being "explored" to "step up pressure on the Syrian regime and bolster the opposition." The report also makes mention of calls to arm the opposition. Surely, placing pressure on a government that has just restored order across the country, while "bolstering" or arming the opposition will only trigger yet another round of bloodshed and violence.
Indeed the entire premise of the "Responsibility to Protect (R2P)" doctrine follows that if a nation is incapable of providing protection for its own population, it relinquishes its sovereignty to direct intervention by the "international community." Should such a nation manage to restore order, however, the R2P doctrine along with the meddling it justifies and the window for regime change it opens no longer applies. Knowing this, and realizing the window for forcing regime change in Syria is closing, the West is actually seeking ways to perpetuate the bloodbath, not end it, until their objective of removing President Bashar al-Assad has been achieved - revealing in incredible detail the insidious nature of the so-called "humanitarian" R2P model.
This includes foreign-funding to create proxy opposition movements within targeted nations, training, equipping, and funding mobs of protesters to sow unrest, providing covert military support to ensure the survival of these proxy movements, and a series of financial and economic measures, including sanctions used to poison the will of a nation's people against their government and foster division within ruling parties. Essentially, the violence that then predictably unfolds is cited as justification to intervene more overtly and ensure regime change is accomplished and a series of neo-liberal reforms instituted.
Setting the Stage for R2P in Syria
Years before unrest unfolded in Syria, the West had determined it would overthrow its government and replace it with a suitable client regime. In 2002, Syria was officially added to America's "Axis of Evil," and according to US Army General Wesley Clark during a 2007 speech, was one of many Arab regimes targeted for regime change.
As early as 2001 - R2P "doctrine" was being devised (.pdf) to use conditions of violent unrest as a pretext to intervene militarily in a any given nation, destroy it politically as well as literally, then rebuild a neo-liberal, globalist client state upon the rubble. As early as 2008, the US State Department began training armies of "activists" to then be sent back to their respective nations across the Arab World and induce violent unrest.
In an April 2011 AFP report, Michael Posner, the assistant US Secretary of State for Human Rights and Labor, stated that the "US government has budgeted $50 million in the last two years to develop new technologies to help activists protect themselves from arrest and prosecution by authoritarian governments."
The report went on to explain that the US "organized training sessions for 5,000 activists in different parts of the world. A session held in the Middle East about six weeks ago gathered activists from Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon who returned to their countries with the aim of training their colleagues there," (emphasis added). Posner would add, "They went back and there's a ripple effect." That ripple effect of course is the "Arab Spring," and in Syria's case, the impetus for the current unrest threatening to unhinge the nation and invite in foreign intervention" using the R2P model.
Despite years of preparing R2P to become an institutionalized mechanism for quickly justifying and executing regime change, almost immediately when it was first rolled out against Libya, it was met with resistance, skepticism, and criticism. Claims of peaceful protesters being brutalized by Qaddafi's troops quickly collapsed as it became known these "protesters" were heavily armed terrorists hailing from the US State Department listed Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Instead of carrying placards as the corporate-media suggested, they were brandishing machines guns, driving tanks, and even at one point piloting fighter jets.
Despite the obvious inconsistencies with the alleged narrative "justifying" R2P and the realities unfolding on the ground, the West through its military alliance NATO began its military intervention to "protect civilians." NATO's military campaign from the beginning, however, did not "protect civilians," but instead provided air support for rebel assaults, intelligence and special operations assistance to rebel military units, and carried the systematic targeting and destroying of Qaddafi's political inner circle - which included bombing the homes of Qaddafi's family, killing his children and his grandchildren in NATO airstrikes.
Toward the end of the campaign, NATO assisted rebels in besieging Libyan cities, including Bani Walid and Sirte. This included shutting off water, electricity, food, and aid and literally starving out city residence while NATO pounded them from the air until they capitulated. In the case of Sirte, the city fought until the bitter end leaving absolute desolation. Other cities targeted included Tawarga in which the entire population of 10,000 was either exterminated or permanently exiled.
"An alternative is for diplomatic efforts to focus first on how to end the violence and how to gain humanitarian access, as is being done under Annan’s leadership. This may lead to the creation of safe-havens and humanitarian corridors, which would have to be backed by limited military power. This would, of course, fall short of U.S. goals for Syria and could preserve Asad in power. From that starting point, however, it is possible that a broad coalition with the appropriate international mandate could add further coercive action to its efforts." -page 4, Assessing Options for Regime Change, Brookings Institution.
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